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Essay
THE GERRYMANDER: A JOURNALISTIC CATCH-WORD OR
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE? THE CASE IN
MARYLAND
PAUL V. NIEMEYER*
Thefollowing paper, delivered to the Wednesday Law Club and
the Lawyers Round Table in Baltimore,' revisits a model for a consti-
tutional analysis of the gerrymander under Article I, Section 2, in
connection with congressional redistricting.2 The historical interpre-
tation of that provision mandates that congressional representation
be direct and equal, precluding any classification of the population
in drawing congressional district lines. Prohibited from making
such classification, the states would be left with a method of redis-
tricting that looks only at population numbers and natural and
political boundaries when drawing lines. Any classification by race,
religion, income, party registration, or other criterion would, under
the model, be found to violate Article I.3
* United States Circuit Judge, Fourth Circuit, A.B., Kenyon College, 1962;J.D., Uni-
versity of Notre Dame, 1966.
1. Address at the Wednesday Law Club (Nov. 4, 1992); address at the Lawyers' Round
Table (Dec. 21, 1992).
2. The text reads in relevant part: "The House of Representatives shall be composed
of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several states.. .. " U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added); compare with "The Senate of the United States shall be
composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof...." Id. § 3, cl. 1,
amended y U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1 (emphasis added).
3. In Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993), the Supreme Court held that a racial
gerrymander in North Carolina congressional redistricting, created to give effect to Sec-
tion 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973p (1988), was subject
to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
2825. Commenting on Congressional Districts 1 and 12 in North Carolina as their bounda-
ries were then drawn, the Court stated: "A reapportionment plan that includes in one
district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by
geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in common with one an-
other but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political
apartheid." Id. at 2827. The Court left open the question of whether a gerrymander for
reasons other than race "always gives rise to an equal protection claim." Id. at 2828. Yet,
over the years, various decisions of the Court have expressed the view that political gerry-
manders can be unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (concluding that political gerrymandering was justiciable
under the Equal Protection Clause). The level of scrutiny applied in an analysis under the
Equal Protection Clause may not be consistent, however, with the public's view that gerry-
manders for any reason are pernicious in that they classify the voters on non-relevant bases
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Since 1812, the "gerrymander" or "to gerrymander" has been
used frequently on editorial pages to characterize pejoratively a form
of political conduct in establishing election districts. Commenting on
a proposed version of a congressional redistricting plan for Maryland,
an editorial of the Baltimore Sun found the term yet inadequate for its
purposes:
The gerrymander is a staple of American political his-
tory, but the Governor's Redistricting Advisory Committee
plan to redraw congressional district lines in Maryland is so
outrageously partisan, silly and illogical that it would make
even Elbridge Gerry turn over in his grave. State Republican
leaders have already said that they intend to challenge this
plan in court if it becomes law. They should. They would
win. The plan is not only goofy, it is unconstitutional.4
This was but one of the ongoing media attacks against Maryland's
redistricting efforts following the 1990 decennial census. Newspapers
characterized the messy process as, "political backbiting and shrill ar-
gument, time-consuming stalemates, and puzzling maps on the Mary-
land page of The Sun."5 Headlines that appeared throughout the
central Maryland area read: The Gang That Couldn't Draw Straight: The
Real Story Behind the Redistricting Fiasco;6 Maryland's Political Power Bro-
kers Decide Where to Put Congressman Tom McMillen;7 "People's Plan"for
Maryland Congressional Districts Makes Some People Angry and Md. Con-
gressional Redistricting Plan Sets Off Bipartisan Furor.' Nathan Landow,
Chairman of the Maryland Democratic Party-and sometimes adver-
sary of Democratic Governor William Donald Schaefer, who openly
supported Republican Congresswoman Helen Bentley-acknowl-
edged the politics of the process: "To say this is a non-partisan issue is
ridiculous.... We're interested in protecting our Democrats and get-
for the purpose of manipulating the outcome of elections. Consequently, this Article reex-
amines earlier constitutional analyses of gerrymandering outside the context of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Considering the historical interpretation of Article I, Section 2, of the
Constitution offered below, a case can be made for the unconstitutionality of gerrymander-
ing that meets most intuitive reservations about it under a lesser level of scrutiny than
required when applying the Equal Protection Clause.
4. Editorial, THE SUN (Baltimore), Aug. 26, 1991, at 6A.
5. Patrickj. Kiger, The Gang that Couldn't Draw Straight: The Real Story Behind the Redis-
tricting Fiasco, BALT. Mco., Dec. 1991, at 60, 105.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 60.
8. C. Fraser Smith, "People's Plan"for Mayland Congressional Districts Make Some People
Angry, THE SUN (Baltimore), Aug. 25, 1991, at 5G.
9. Tom Bowman & C. Fraser Smith, Md. Congressional Redistricting Plan Sets OffBiparti-
san Furor, THE SUN (Baltimore), Aug. 22, 1991, at IA.
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ting rid of every Republican, including Mrs. Bentley."1 From my
reading of the media accounts, I think it is fair to characterize the
summer of 1991 as a domestic Democratic free-for-all in which Repub-
lican Congresswoman Bentleyjoined. The conflict was resolved by an
old-fashioned, back room political caucus of a few to favor the incum-
bencies of Congressman Steny Hoyer (D. 5th), Congressman Ben Car-
din (D. 3d) and Congresswoman Helen Bentley (R. 2d), and to
exclude Congressman Tom McMillen (D. 4th). Let me begin by pro-
viding a few highlights of the historical events.
I
The 1990 census data for Maryland revealed that the State would
not gain or lose any of its eight congressional seats. Although the
state's population increased modestly, there were no remarkable pop-
ulation shifts, except one. The African-American population in Con-
gressman Steny Hoyer's Fifth District surrounding Washington, D.C.
to the northeast had become a substantial majority, creating the real
possibility that the district might wish to have an African-American
representative. This likelihood threatened the re-election of Hoyer.
Hoyer was the fourth most powerful member of the U.S. House of
Representatives. Almost all Democratic Party interests recognized not
only that carving out a substantially African-American district from
Steny Hoyer's Fifth District would serve the Congressman, but also
that the new district could be justified publicly by alluding to pur-
ported requirements of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.1' No evidence
has ever surfaced, however, to suggest that Hoyer's original Fifth Dis-
trict with its new African-American majority did not already satisfy the
requirements of the Act. The realpolitik was revealed starkly, as The
Sun reported:
In the very beginning of the Maryland process, Demo-
cratic party leaders made it very clear their priority was to
protect Rep. Steny H. Hoyer, D-Md.-5th. "Protect" in this
case means the cunning manipulation of district lines. Mr.
Hoyer... had attained so much seniority and clout he could
not be left wholly vulnerable to the winds of voter
sentiment.12
Once it was concluded that an African-American district would be
created in the Prince George's County area and that Steny Hoyer
10. Kiger, supra note 5, at 103.
11. Bowman & Smith, supra note 9, at 4A.
12. Smith, supra note 8, at 5G.
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The Political Art
of Gerrymandering
Taking care of one's party at the
expense of the weaker one is as
traditional as stuffing the ballot
-, box in American politics.
THE SUN (Baltimore), Aug. 25, 1991, at 5G. Reprinted with permission of The Baltimore Sun
would be provided a majority white district that wrapped around the
African-American district, the musical-chairs process of adjusting
other congressional districts began. It was clear that one incumbent
would be disenfranchised. The caucusing and deal-making thereafter
proceeded without real regard to the will of the people. Indeed, a
newspaper published in Hoyer's district reported the results of a poll
which revealed that seventy percent of the Prince George's County
voters were against creating a "new white majority district" for
Hoyer. i3 Statewide, sixty-five percent of the voters were reported to
be against it.14
The tools of the debate were computers loaded with data about
the location of every citizen in Maryland, including his or her political
affiliation, voting record, race, and other census information. As pro-
posed district lines were drawn on the computer screen, printouts
could provide data from which a candidate could predict his or her
chances of re-election. A story described potential African-American
13. Lynda V. Mapes, Poll: Protecting Hoyer Not Worth It, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTYJOUR-
NAL, Sept. 4, 1991, at A5.
14. Id. (reporting the results of a Maxon-Dixon Opinion Research poll).
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candidates for the new seat in Prince George's County working at the
elbow of computer operators with telephones in hand.1 5 Boundary
lines were adjusted depending on precinct support determined by
contemporaneous telephone calls. 6
In the end, Maryland House Bill 10 was finalized and adopted. 7
Congresswoman Bentley, because of Governor Schaefer's interven-
tion, was protected with a Second District electorate that favored her
interests; Congressman Cardin was given an essentially white district
in the shape of a large, backwards "C" that began in Baltimore County
and ended beyond Columbia in Howard County; an African-American
district was created in suburban Washington; and Hoyer was provided
a safe, white district that extended from Southern Maryland, wrapping
around the African-American district, to the Montgomery County
line. The victim of this political maneuvering, Anne Arundel County,
was divided into four portions, dismembering the old Fourth District,
and squeezing out Congressman Tom McMillen.
The congressional redistricting map of central Maryland had thus
become a hodge-podge of lines bearing no relationship to traditional
political or natural boundaries. As established by House Bill 10, the
First District on the Eastern Shore leaps across the Chesapeake Bay to
include Annapolis and a portion of Anne Arundel County on the west-
ern shore, rather than following the contour of the bay and the state's
northern border into Harford County. The Second District likewise
leaps from Baltimore County across the mouth of the Patapsco River
into Anne Arundel County to pick up 45,000 residents who can only
travel by boat if they wish to remain in the district and visit their repre-
sentative. The Third District, described on the floor of the Maryland
House as the "splitting amoeba,"'" consists of one ill-defined portion
in the north artistically weaving in and out of Baltimore County and
Baltimore City, connected by a thin strip in East Baltimore to another
ill-defined portion in the south covering portions of Baltimore City,
Baltimore County, Anne Arundel County, and Howard County. The
new African-American Fourth District is rooted in Prince George's
County but snakes into Montgomery County selectively to pick up
black neighborhoods. The Fifth District reaches from Southern Mary-
15. Kiger, supra note 5, at 63, 101.
16. Id.
17. Md. H.B. 10, 1991 Sess. (2d Special) (passed by Md. Senate Oct. 21, 1991; passed by
Md. House Oct. 22, 1991; signed by Md. Governor Schaefer Oct. 23, 1991).
18. Anne Arundel County Republican Cent. Comm. v. State Admin. Bd. of Election
Laws, 781 F. Supp. 394, 408 (D. Md. 1991) (three-judge panel) (Niemeyer, Circuit Judge,
dissenting), aft'd, 112 S. Ct. 2269 (1992).
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land through Anne Arundel County into eastern Prince George's
County and over to Montgomery County.
Anne Arundel County was divided into four parts, and each part
became a small adjunct of a congressional district oriented to other
geographical areas. The county therefore had no unified representa-
tion. Anne Arundel County citizens and both political parties filed
suit in federal court to challenge the constitutionality of the new redis-
tricting law.19 The case was assigned to a three-judge court on which I
served as the circuit judge and Judges Frederic N. Smalkin and Frank
A. Kaufman served as the districtjudges. "° I must tell you at the outset
that I was outvoted and the Supreme Court affirmed summarily. 1
The majority approved the congressional redistricting enacted by
Maryland House Bill 10, relying essentially on the fact that each Mary-
land district contained substantially the same number of people.22
Therefore, my views in that case-that the court's analysis of a redis-
tricting plan cannot end with the examination of numbers alone
when the plan was based on other factors-might rightfully be charac-
terized as "sour grapes." This I leave for your judgment.
In its brief, the State of Maryland surprisingly conceded that dis-
trict lines were drawn for the personal political purposes of a few. In
particular, the State recognized that the old Fifth District of Steny
Hoyer could not be left in its original configuration because it put
Hoyer, a white incumbent, in a majority African-American district.
The State argued that while a plan based on the original configura-
tion "may have survived a legal challenge, [it] increase[d] the
probability that the State could lose one of its most senior and power-
ful congressmen. " "
Are we offended by a redistricting process that so crassly serves
the personal political fortunes of a few? And should we be? More
importantly, does it constitute gerrymandering, and is gerrymander-
ing proscribed by the Constitution? After I discuss briefly what gerry-
19. Anne Arundel County Republican Cent. Comm. v. State Admin. Bd. of Election
Laws, No. S-91-3200 (D. Md. filed Nov. 12, 1991).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) provides: "A district court of three judges shall be convened
when otherwise required by Act of Congress, or when an action is filed challenging the
constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts or the appointment of any
statewide legislative body."
21. Anne Arundel County Republican Cent. Comm. v. State Admin. Bd. of Election
Laws, 112 S. Ct. 2269 (1992) (mem.).
22. Anne Arundel County, 781 F. Supp. at 401.
23. State's Memorandum of Law in Support of State's Opposition to Motion for Pre-
liminary Injunction and State's Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment, at 26,
Anne Arundel County Republican Cent. Comm. v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 781
F. Supp. 394 (D. Md. 1991) (Civ. No. S-91-3200), aft'd, 112 S. Ct. 2269 (1992).
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mandering is understood to be, I will suggest that it may raise a
serious constitutional issue.
II
"Gerrymander" is generally defined as the intentional alteration
of established political boundaries or the creation of artificial "com-
munities" by the grouping of political units to form temporary elec-
tion districts for the purpose of effecting an election outcome.24
Although the gerrymandered district can take an infinite variety of
shapes, the techniques used to accomplish the political purpose of a
gerrymander are relatively uniform. In a single-member election dis-
trict, any votes for the winning candidate in excess of fifty percent plus
one are considered "wasted," from the perspective of the candidate's
political party.25 Since the aim of the party creating the gerrymander
is "to make its votes count the most in the election and the vote of the
opposition as little as possible,"26 the gerrymanderer attempts to draw
district lines which "pack" (or "stack") into as few a number of districts
as possible the projected votes in favor of the opposition. Simultane-
ously, the map-maker spreads out his party's vote by "cracking," that is
by drawing the remaining districts in such a way as to maintain a small
but safe majority.2 7
Almost ninety years ago, Professor Elmer C. Griffith wrote:
The gerrymander is a political device of far-reaching ef-
fect. It sets aside the will of the popular majority. It is a spe-
cies of fraud, deception, and trickery which menaces the
perpetuity of the Republic of the United States more threat-
eningly than does, perhaps, the injustice of unjust taxation,
for it deals more fundamentally with representative
government.28
24. See ELMER C. GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER 15-22
(Arno Press revised ed. 1974) (1907); see also Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538
(1969) (defining a gerrymander as "the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district
boundaries and populations for partisan or personal political purposes") (Fortas, J.,
concurring).
25. Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Proce-
dural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 301, 303 (1991)
(arguing that the non-political effect of the gerrymander is the "noncompact" electoral
district).
26. GRIFFrrH, supra note 24, at 21.
27. Id. at 21. Griffith's observation that the anti-majoritarian character of gerryman-
dering is subversive of republican principles is not novel. See Polsby & Popper, supra note
25, at 303-04.
28. GRIFFITH, supra note 24, at 7.
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As early as 1789, Virginians characterized a perceived gerrymander
attempt "as a violation of the rights of a free people due to 'party spirit
or to the overgrown influence of individuals."'29 In his third annual
message to Congress in December 1891, President Benjamin Harrison
declared: "If I were called upon to declare wherein our chief national
danger lies, I would say without hesitation, in the overthrow of major-
ity control by the suppression or perversion of the popular suffrage."3"
And today, too, it is widely accepted that gerrymandering undermines
the American republican institution.31
The practice of drawing district lines to commandeer elections
has existed in America since the colonial period. 2 The advent of the
term "gerrymander" coincided with the initial popularity of the prac-
tice in Massachusetts during the spring of 1812." While the Federal-
ist Party had controlled the Massachusetts legislature in the early
1800s," 4 the Republicans had gained control of all three branches of
the state's government as a result of the election of 1810." The elec-
tion of 1810 was characterized not only by an apathetic electorate, but
by rhetoric and hyperbole sufficient to show that the "mud slinging"
which is seemingly characteristic of modem political campaigning is
by no means of recent vintage. 6
29. Id. at 41 (quoting THE VIRGINIA HERALD AND FREDERICKSBURG ADVERTISER, Jan. 15,
1789).
30. Id. at 10 (quoting MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 208-11 (James D. Rich-
ardson ed., 1897)).
31. See Martin Shapiro, Gerrymandering, Fairness, and the Supreme Court, 33 UCLA L. REV.
227, 239 (1985) (describing gerrymandering as a "pathology of democracy"); Polsby &
Popper, supra note 25, at 304-07 (contrasting the threat posed by gerrymandering to a
"Madisonian version of constitutional democracy"); see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S.
109, 177 (1986) ("Intelligent voters, regardless of party affiliation, resent this sort of polit-
ical manipulation of the electorate for no public purpose.") (Powell, J., concurring).
32. GRIFFITH, supra note 24, at 13.
33. Id. at 16-17.
34. GEORGE A. BILLIAS, ELBRIDGE GERRY, FOUNDING FATHER AND REPUBLICAN STATESMAN
316 (1976).
35. Id. at 315.
36. For example, the Federalist candidate in 1810 was the incumbent governor, Chris-
topher Gore. The Federalists portrayed Gore as "a true American divested of foreign influ-
ence and undue partialities." BILLAS, supra note 34, at 313 (quoting MASS. SPY, Feb. 14,
1810, and Mar. 14, 1810). The Republicans, on the other hand, accused Gore of being a
Tory who venerated the British constitution and was conspiring to create a "Northern Con-
federacy" among Britain and the other New England states. Id. (quoting NAT'L AEGIS, Jan.
31, 1810; Feb. 7, 1810; Feb. 28, 1810; and Mar. 28, 1810).
The Republican candidate was Elbridge Gerry, who his party touted as the "Veteran of
the Revolution, the sage of '76, the friend and confidant of the important Washington, of
Adams, of Jefferson, and of Madison, and the calm and considerate patriot." Id. at 313
(quoting NAT'L AEGIS, Feb. 21, 1810). According to the Federalists, however, Gerry was a
"French partizan" whose faction had destroyed American commerce, slashed state reve-
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Elbridge Gerry won the 1810 Massachusetts gubernatorial race."'
Gerry was an early advocate of American independence, a prominent
member of the Continental Congress, and a principal supplier of the
Continental Army during the Revolutionary War."' He was also a
delegate to the Constitutional Convention, which created a document
that he found himself unable, or unwilling to sign.3 9 Nevertheless,
after ratification of the Constitution, he lent his full support to the
new government and served as a congressman from Massachusetts.4"
In 1810, he won a bid for governor of Massachusetts.41 Later Gerry
went on to serve as Vice-President of the United States under Presi-
dent James Madison. 42 Gerry's reputation was as an anti-federalist,4
anti-militarist 44 and, for much of his life (at least until he became gov-
ernor), an anti-political party man. 45 Gerry, however, believed that
the Federalists desired military rule, or even a return to monarchy,
and that they acted as agents of the English in an effort to achieve that
end.46 In a letter to Thomas Jefferson, Gerry depicted an America
nues by two-thirds, making necessary the levy of new taxes and who, if elected, would work
to create an alliance with France and a war with England. Id at 313 (quoting MAss. Spy,
Feb. 14, 1810, Feb. 28, 1810; and Mar. 28, 1810).
37. Id. at 313.
38. Id. at 153.
39. Gerry stated eleven objections to the proposed national constitution, but stated
that he could accept the document "if the rights of the Citizens had not been rendered
insecure" by three powers that he listed:
1. [B]y the general power of the Legislature to make what laws they may
please to call necessary and proper.
2. [To] raise armies and money without limit.
3. [To] establish a tribunal without injuries, which will be a Star-chamber as
to Civil cases.
Id. at 199 (quoting Madison's Notes (Sept. 15, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, 633 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)).
40. See generally id. at 218-35.
41. See id. at 308-09.
42. GRIFFITH, supra note 24, at 19.
43. See generally BILLIAS, supra note 34, at 152-205.
44. Billias portrays Gerry's fear of the establishment of a military government, or worse,
a return to monarchy in the United States as a primary driving force in Gerry's life. Be-
cause Gerry saw the Federalist Party as an organization bent on militarism and monarchy,
Billias argues that Gerry was forced to compromise his dislike for political parties, which he
also saw as a threat to republicanism. BILLtAS, supra note 34, at 221; see also GRFFITH, supra
note 24, at 31-41 (describing an alleged gerrymander attempt by Patrick Henry to prevent
Samuel Madison from acquiring a seat in the First Congress). Gerry's reluctant affiliation
with the Republicans was unnecessary to combat the greater threat posed by Federalist
control of the government. See id. at 308-14.
45. See, e.g., BILLIAS, supra note 34, at 221 (describing Gerry's mistrust of political
parties).
46. Id. at 310.
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"menaced from without and within."47 The mission of Gerry and the
Republicans became to insulate the Federalists from power.48
To accomplish this end, the Republicans consolidated control
over the Massachusetts government. They removed the Federalists
from government positions and installed party members in both newly
created executive branch positions and patronage jobs in the state
court system.49 The Republicans established a new circuit court of
common pleas, giving Gerry the power to appoint sheriffs and clerks
of court.5" The "gerrymander" of 1812 arose in this context, with the
express goal of "mak[ing] the state Senate a Republican bastion not
only to pass legislation but to help elect Republicans to the national
Senate."51
The Massachusetts Republicans devised a redistricting plan that
created a new "Essex" district which cut back and forth across county
lines, split towns, isolated towns from their proper counties, and man-
aged to pick up numerous Jeffersonians. 2 Opponents attacked the
plan almost from its inception. Even before its passage, newspapers
described the plan as "'cutting up counties and carving out dis-
tricts.'""S Before 1812, the practice in Massachusetts was to elect state
senators as representatives of entire counties, and thus no deviation
from established county lines was required to establish senatorial dis-
tricts.5 4 Had that practice been followed in the election of 1812, the
Essex County voters would have chosen a solid block of five Federalist
state senators. 55 However, with the Republicans' redistricting plan in
place, three Republican senators were elected.5 6
Almost immediately after the plan's enactment, the Federalists
claimed that the plan "would defeat the will of the majority by arbi-
trary means, and thereby undermine the safety of republican institu-
tions." 7 On March 6, 1812, Nathan Hale, an editor of the Boston
47. Id.
48. See id. at 316.
49. See id. at 316-17.
50. Id. at 316.
,-51. Id.
52. GRIFFITH, supra note 24, at 17; see also BiLAS, supra note 34, at 317 ("Essex County
... provided a good example of gerrymandering.").
53. GRIFFITH, supra note 24, at 20 (quoting SALEM GAzETrE, Mar. 27, 1812).
54. BILLIAS, supra note 34, at 316-17.
55. Id. at 317.
56. Id. The Republican redistricting plan was enacted on February 11, 1812. Id.
57. Id. Ironically, as Billias points out, it was the security of the safety of republican
institutions from the Federalist danger that prompted the method of redistricting in the
first instance. Id.
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THE GERRY-MANDER.
A new species of Monster, which appeared in Essex South District in Jan. 1812.
0 generation of VpEtEs! who hath warnedyou of the wroJh tocome ?"
BOSTON GAZETrE, Mar. 26, 1812.
Reprinted with permission of the American Antiquarian Society,
Worcester, Mass.
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Weekly Messenger, published a map depicting the new Essex district.58
A comment about the map was made at a Boston dinner party that
"the outer district but needed wings to resemble a pre-historic mon-
ster, '59 which inspired Elkanah Tisdale, an artist-and incidentally a
Federalist-to depict the protean district complete with wings and
claws. Upon seeing Tisdale's map, a guest remarked that the district
"looks like a salamander."6 ° No, someone responded, it resembled a
"gerrymander."61 The appellation stuck. It was unveiled publicly for
the first time in the March 26, 1812, edition of the Boston Gazette, in a
political cartoon and editorial entitled "The Gerry-mander. 62
It is interesting, and perhaps ironic, that the patently partisan dis-
tricting scheme which carved and mangled Gerry's home county
should bear his name. While it is true that, as governor, Gerry signed
the redistricting act into law and indeed had been acting as a recently
notorious partisan, the scholars tend to agree that Gerry was not the
originator of the redistricting bill.63 Samuel Dana, who presided over
the Massachusetts Senate at the time, has been generally credited with
the plan's conception.64 One newspaper at the time suggested that
Judge Joseph Story, who served as speaker of the House until January
18, 1812, when he resigned to become an Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, might have been responsible.65
Whatever the origins of the Massachusetts redistricting bill of 1812,
the political tool used to the Republicans' advantage that year un-
doubtedly will continue to bear Elbridge Gerry's name.
58. GRIFFITH, supra note 24, at 17.
59. Id.
60. BiLiAS, supra note 34, at 317.
61. Id.; GRIFFrrH, supra note 24, at 17.
62. BOSTON GAZE-rrE, Mar. 26, 1812. The editorial began "'0 generation of Vipers!
who hath warned you of the wrath to come?' The horrid Monster, of which this drawing is
a correct representation, appeared in the County of Essex, during the session of the Legis-
lature." Id. The article goes on to propose that the term "Gerry-mania" be substituted for
"gerry-mander," noting the similarity between the word "Gerry," the French "guerre," and
the Italian "guerra," meaning "war." Id. The substituted term would serve a "double ad-
vantage of expressing the characteristic ferocity of this monster, and that magnanimous
rage for war which seems to have taken such possession of our worthy Chief Magistrate and
his friends." Id.
63. BiLLiAs, supra note 34, at 317 ("In all probability, Gerry was not even the originator
of the bill that bore his name. According to his son-in-law he hesitated before signing it
into law.").
64. GRIFMFIH, supra note 24, at 20.
65. Id. Griffith quotes the Columbian Centinel as implying Story's implication in the
matter: "'It would be well, however, if we could so ascertain beyond a doubt the real Father
of this unnatural monster, that we might hold him up to everlasting scorn and contempt. He
must, and he shall be found out and exposed-and it shall be left to an impartial public to
Judge of this most wicked Story.'" Id. (quoting COLUMBIAN CENTINEL, May 23, 1912).
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Over the years, in newspapers, law review articles, and other liter-
ature written on gerrymandering-indeed, even in the individual
statements of many of the Supreme Court justices who have written on
it-the practice has been condemned as contrary to the fundamentals
of a democratic republic.6 Nevertheless, the issue has a relatively
short judicial history, having been scrutinized by the Supreme Court
only during the last thirty years. What apparently remains unresolved,
however, is the question of whether or not gerrymandering is
constitutional.
III
Because the qualifications of congressional representatives and
the establishment of the House of Representatives are matters indige-
nous to the legislative branch, the Supreme Court traditionally has
kept the courts out of congressional redistricting issues. It was, as we
say, thought to be a "political question."67 This attitude changed with
the landmark decision, Baker v. Carr." In Baker, Justice Brennan, writ-
ing for the majority, determined that the claim that a Tennessee ap-
portionment statute denied equal protection of the laws presented a
justiciable question.69 Within two years, the Court for the first time
faced similar questions about the constitutionality of congressional re-
districting. In Wesbery v. Sanders,7° the Court concluded that the ques-
tion whether Georgia congressional district lines were drawn in
conformance to the requirements of Article I, Section 2 of the Consti-
tution was likewise justiciable.7 The Court proceeded to hold that
Article I, Section 2, requires one person one vote.7 2 The Court stated:
"We hold that, construed in its historical context, the command of
Art. I, Section 2, that Representatives be chosen 'by the People of the
several States' means that as nearly as practicable one man's vote in a
congressional election is to be worth as another's." 3 From its histori-
cal analysis of Article I, Section 2, and the careful distinction made at
the Constitutional Convention between the method for electing
66. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) ("The Constitution has left
the performance of many duties in our governmental scheme to depend on the fidelity of
the executive and legislative action and, ultimately on the vigilance of the people in exer-
cising their potential rights.").
68. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
69. Id. at 237.
70. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
71. Id. at 6-7.
72. Id. at 7-8.
73. Id. (quoting from U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2).
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House members and that for electing Senators, the Court concluded:
"Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of
people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this right."74 The Court
continued, quoting approvingly from Federalist No. 57, the words of
James Madison:
Who are to be the electors of the Federal Representatives?
Not the rich more than the poor; not the learned more than
the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names,
more than the humble sons of obscurity and unpropitious
fortune. The electors are to be the great body of the people
of the United States ....
After Wesberry, the Court proceeded to establish the requirement,
under the guidance of Justice Brennan in Kirkpatrick v. Preisle?6 in
1969 and Karcher v. Daggett" in 1983, that Article I, Section 2, requires
that the states make good-faith efforts to achieve precise mathematical
equality in the population among congressional districts and that any
variance would have to be justified by the state no matter how small.78
In neither Kirkpatrick nor Karcher, however, did the Court address
whether gerrymandering was unconstitutional. In Karcher, the major-
ity opinion of five justices stated only that "a federal principle of popu-
lation equality does not prevent any state from taking steps to inhibit
gerrymandering, so long as a good faith effort is made to achieve pop-
ulation equality as well."79 Justice Stevens, who joined the fivejudge
majority, also wrote separately.8" After observing that his vote was the
decisive fifth vote, he stated that "mere numerical equality is not a
sufficient guarantee of equal protection.... [A] standard of 'absolute
equality is perfectly compatible with gerrymandering of the worst sort.
A computer may grind out district lines which can totally frustrate the
popular will on an overwhelming number of critical issues.'"8 Justice
White, who wrote a dissenting opinion for four justices seemed to
74. Id. at 17-18.
75. Id. at 18 (quoting THE FEIERAusT No. 57 (James Madison)).
76. 394 U.S. 526 (1969) (holding that a de minimis district population variance stan-
dard is inconsistent with the "as nearly as practicable" equal representation standard com-
manded by Art. I, § 2).
77. 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (holding that without justification no de minimis population
variances may be considered as meeting the standard of Art. I, § 2).
78. Id. at 731-34; Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 530-31; see also Anne Arundel County Republi-
can Cent. Comm. v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 781 F. Supp. 394, 396 (1991).
79. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 734 n.6.
80. Id. at 744-65 (Stevens, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 752 (Stevens,J., concurring) (quoting Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 551
(1969) (Harlan,J., dissenting)).
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agree with Stevens.12 White took issue with Justice Brennan's require-
ment of mathematical precision and complained that such a holding
does not reach the issue which is the greater threat to the equality of
representation, the issue of a gerrymander."3 Quoting approvingly
from an unidentified commentator, Justice White said, "'The empha-
sis of one man, one vote not only permits gerrymandering, it encour-
ages it."' 8 4  Thus, five justices expressed a constitutionally-based
concern about the threat of gerrymandering, without directly address-
ing the issue.
In Anne Arundel County, the State of Maryland concluded that
these dicta were inconclusive and that therefore Article I, Section 2 of
the Constitution does not prohibit gerrymandering.8 5 According to
the State, Article I, Section 2 would not be violated even by a district
line drawn "to snake through the alleys and cul-de-sacs of twenty-three
different counties in order to match two white people for each black,
or two democrats for each republican, for the purpose of advancing
the chances that the favored class would win an election while diluting
the vote of the unfavored class."86 Judges Smalkin and Kaufman, who
were unwilling to go so far as to accept the State's position, said in
their majority opinion that "[w]e do not ... believe that there are no
limits upon gerrymandering." 7
Nevertheless, the Anne Arundel County majority was unwilling to
call Maryland's plan a gerrymander because it did not go "so far be-
yond the pale as to be unacceptable." 8 The majority concluded that
while gerrymandering "in our federal constitutional setting is hard to
define,... 'most of us know it when we see it."'89 Thus, I am not sure
that Judges Smalkin and Kaufman disagree with the conclusion of my
dissent that Article I, Section 2, prohibits gerrymandering. Clearly the
majority did not accept my conclusion that Maryland's redistricting
82. Id. at 765-90 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White was joined in dissent by Chief
Justice Burger, Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist.
83. Id. at 776 (White, J., dissenting). "Although neither a rule of absolute equality nor
one of substantial equality can alone prevent deliberate partisan gerrymandering," Justice
White argued, "the former offers legislatures a ready justification for disregarding geo-
graphical and political boundaries." Id. (White, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 776 n. 12 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC.,
STATE POLITICS AND REDISTRICTING 1-2 (1982)).
85. See Anne Arundel County Republican Cent. Comm. v. State Admin. Bd. of Election
Laws, 781 F. Supp. 394, 402 (D. Md. 1991) (Niemeyer, CircuitJudge, dissenting) affd, 112
S. Ct. 2269 (1992).
86. Id. (Niemeyer, Circuit Judge, dissenting).
87. Id. at 400.
88. Id. at n.il.
89. Id. (quoting to Justice Stewart's comment about pornography inJacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184 (1964)).
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law exemplifies gerrymandering. The Maryland redistricting law con-
cededly reflects the will of a few state legislators and congressional
representatives; it adopts congressional district lines based on classifi-
cations of people; and it interposes the state legislature as an interme-
diate agency between the federal government and the citizenry to
block the will of the people.
IV
To resolve an impasse that nearly brought the Constitutional
Convention to an end during the hot summer of 1787, the Great
Compromise was reached, establishing two houses in the legislative
branch of government: the House to be elected by the people9 and the
Senate to be elected by state legislatures.9 As William Samuel Johnson
summed it up, "'in one branch the people ought to be represented; in
the other, the States.' 9 2
The distinction between the methods of selecting representatives
and senators was of fundamental importance to the Founding Fathers,
and it was firmly established in the Constitution. While state legisla-
tures were entitled to elect senators, representatives were to be elected
directly by the people, without any state agency involved in the elec-
tion of representatives because such agency would interfere with the
will of the people. The drafters thus crafted the direct election of repre-
sentatives to bypass state legislatures. As Elliot's Debates reported on
the Convention:
Mr. Madison considered an election of one branch at least of
the Legislature by the people immediately, as a clear princi-
ple of free government and that this mode under proper reg-
ulations had the additional advantage of securing better
representatives, as well as of avoiding too great an agency of the
state governments in the general one. 3
There appears to be little doubt that the intent of the Conven-
tion, as reflected in Article I, Section 2, was to have House members
elected without state legislative agency. Justice Joseph Story con-
firmed this in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,
written during the first fifty years of our Republic, before any doubt
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
91. Id. § 3, cl. 1.
92. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 13 (1964) (quoting William Samual Johnson in 3
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 461-62 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
93. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, at 75 (James McClellan & M.E. Bradford eds., 1989) (emphasis
added).
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could be introduced by the distractions of our more complex, modem
jurisprudence. He stated:
[T]he house of representatives is required to be composed
of representatives chosen by the people of the several states.
The choice, too, is to be made immediately by them; so that
the power is direct; the influence direct; and the responsibil-
ity direct. If any intermediate agency had been adopted, such
as a choice through an electoral college, or by official per-
sonages, or by select and specifically qualified functionaries
pro hoc vice, it is obvious, that the dependence of the repre-
sentatives upon the people, and the responsibility to them,
would have been far less felt, and far more obstructed.94
I cannot make this case any more forcefully. I am aware of no consti-
tutional principle or authority disputing that the House of Represent-
atives was established to provide (1) direct and equal representation of
the people (2) without any interfering agency on the part of state legisla-
tures. These, I submit, are the two controlling principles that are to
be derived from the historical context. The Constitution, by its ex-
press language, limits the role of state legislative involvement in the
election of house members to establishing the time, place, and man-
ner of elections (subject to federal supervision), and to providing the
people with districts that assure direct and equal representation.95
Thus, state legislatures, in discharging their responsibility to draw
congressional district lines, can be guided only by the goal of provid-
ing direct and equal representation of the people, and not by the in-
terests of legislators, advocacy groups, or the state itself. It is not
unremarkable, therefore, that the Supreme Court in Wesberry-the
first case in which the Court stated the requirements of Article I, Sec-
tion 2-said: "Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of
people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this right [to vote] ."96
Thus, I submit that a state may not, when drawing district lines,
identify voters as rich or poor, African-American or white, Democratic
or Republican, persons who voted for one candidate or persons who
are expected to vote for another. To do so introduces classifications,
constituting "'the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district bound-
aries and populations for partisan or personal political purposes."'97
94. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 212
(1987) (emphasis added).
95. U.S. CONsT., art. I, § 4; Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 10-18 (1964); STORY, supra
note 94, at 291-94.
96. Wesberny, 376 U.S at 17-18 (emphasis added).
97. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 775, 786 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Kirk-
patrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring)).
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While this, as we have observed, would violate the historical intent of
Article I, Section 2, it is also the classic definition of a gerrymander.
98
When we eliminate from consideration any classification of the
people or of the voters that is designed to favor the votes of one group
and dilute those of another, we are left with redistricting criteria that
are essentially neutral. Districts then could be based on blind popula-
tion figures, traditional political boundaries such as county and city
lines, and geophysical features such as rivers, lakes, and mountains.
V
Turning to the events in Maryland during 1991, I need not dwell
on them long. It readily appears that instead of looking at popula-
tion, without regard to race, wealth, political party, and projected
vote, the line-drawers utilized those very classifications to create a safe
seat for Congressman Hoyer, to provide Congressman Cardin with Co-
lumbia voters, to leave the port population and Baltimore County in-
tact for Congresswoman Bentley, and to remove the African-American
majority from Hoyer's district in creating a new seat. As the line-draw-
ers favored a particular group, they of necessity diluted the influence
of the opposing group. Concomitantly, they ignored traditional
county lines and natural barriers in order to create artificial geograph-
ical areas for temporary congressional representation. While an awk-
ward and misshapen district does not alone create a gerrymander, it
should alert a court to the possibility that the lines were drawn to dis-
tort district boundaries and populations for partisan or personal polit-
ical purposes.
Consequently, I suggest for your consideration the statement I
made to begin my opinion in the Anne Arundel County case:
The Maryland legislature, using data about voters' polit-
ical party registrations, their past voting habits, and their
race, drew congressional district lines to depict the classic
gerrymander in an attempt to control the outcome of future
congressional elections. Because the use of such classifica-
tions in drawing district lines favors one class and of necessity
dilutes the vote of another, the people are not represented
98. I might add that the general prohibition in Article I, Section 2, against classifica-
tions expressly excepted slaves and Indians, an exception that was changed by the Civil
War Amendments.
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directly and equally, as required by Art. I, § 2, of the United
States Constitution.99
As an epilogue, on November 3, 1992, the purpose of the Mary-
land gerrymander was accomplished. Congressman Hoyer was re-
elected in his new district, as were Congresswoman Bentley and
Congressman Cardin in theirs. Congressman McMillen, whose district
was eliminated, chose to run in the First District, but was defeated by
the First District Republican incumbent, Wayne Gilchrist. Albert
Wynn, an African-American, was indeed elected in the new Fourth
District. And the districts, in their misshapen glory, will remain estab-
lished for the next four congressional elections-until the year 2000
when we will consider the issues again.
99. Anne Arundel County Republican Cent. Comm. v. State Admin. Bd. of Election
Laws, 781 F. Supp. 394, 401 (D. Md. 1991) (Niemeyer, CircuitJudge, dissenting), aff'd, 112
S. Ct. 2269 (1992).
260 [VOL. 54:242
